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refers not so much to the making of the same products in

the same plant, but to an appearance to the employee of a continuation
of the old labor policy, which, in turn, frustrates the policies of the National Labor Relations Act.
An innocent purchaser can now be required by the NLRB to remedy
the unfair labor practices of his predecessor under the successorship
theory. Although an unrestricted exercise of this authority may place
an unjust burden upon the purchaser, an examination of the contractual
options available to the purchaser indicates that innocent purchaser liability, as limited by the successorship theory, is not manifestly unfair.
If the prospective buyer has notice of the unfair labor charge, as required
by U.S. Pipe, he can insulate himself from the hardships imposed by the
subsequent order either by negotiating for a reduced purchase price or
for an indemnity clause in the contract of sale. Admittedly, the innocent
purchaser cannot be relieved of all the burdens through contractual agreement ;32 however, any remaining burden is negligible when contrasted to
the deleterious effects of an unremedied violation. In light of this consideration, the court in U.S. Pipe properly balanced the equities.
JERRY W. LEONARD

Real Property-Mortgagee's Rights in Security
The California Supreme Court, in the recent decision of American
Savings & Loan Association v. Leeds,' imposed significant limitations
on a purchase money mortgagee's rights to his security. Contrary to the
situations in other states, the California mortgagee finds himself in an
increasingly precarious position. The Leeds decision not only increases
the mortgagee's risk, but also injects a degree of uncertainty into the law.
The plaintiff in Leeds was the beneficiary of a deed of trust given to
secure a debt defendant Leeds had incurred to purchase real estate from
defendants Sheridan. The Sheridans had falsely represented that the
house had been built on unfilled land and had also concealed defects
caused by subsidence due to improper filling. After the sale, when further

"United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir.
1968).
2 For example, a stigma possibly attaches to an employer involved in an unfair
labor proceeding.
I
Cal. 2d -, 440 P.2d 933, 68 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1968).
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subsidence rendered the property "worthless or of little or no value,"2
Leeds sued the Sheridans for the purchase price and settled the action
for an unknown amount. In its action, the mortgagee sought to recover
general and punitive damages from the Sheridans, to hold Leeds liable
for its loss on the theory that his failure to keep the property in repair
destroyed its security, and to impose a trust on the amount Leeds had recovered from the Sheridans. Leeds demurred, and the court dismissed
the complaint against him.
On appeal, plaintiff argued that covenants by Leeds in the deed
of trust to "keep said property in good condition and repair . . . [and]

to complete or restore promptly and in good condition and workmanlike
manner any building which may be constructed, damaged, or destroyed
thereon,"' and to assign to the plaintiff "[a] ny award of damages in connection with any condemnation for public use or injury to said property

. . ."'

entitled him to recover.

In ruling on the second quoted covenant, the court held that the settlement that Leeds had received in the prior suit was not for injury to
the property, but for the "fraudulent or negligent wrong in inducing defendant to purchase the property." 5 For that reason, the money could
not be regarded as a substitute for the injured property. By differentiating between recoveries for injury to land and for fraudulent representations about land, the court apparently intended to distinguish the situation in Leeds from that in Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank v. Bortenstein." There defendant's mortgaged land was flooded due to negligence
on the part of the city, and defendant had recovered damages from the
city. Plaintiff-mortgagee was allowed to share in the recovery to the
extent of the mortgage as if the city had taken the land for public use.
The money, according to the court, had taken the place of the land, and
defendant had taken possession of the money subject to the plaintiff's
security.
In Leeds the court, while denying that the money collected by Leeds
"takes the place of the land," stated that if the Sheridans had paid Leeds
the full purchase price in the settlement, the plaintiff could impose a
constructive trust to the extent of its security in the premises. Since the
plaintiff was unable to plead the amount that Leeds had received in the
settlement, it was held to have failed to state a cause of action.
2 Id.

at -, 440 P.2d at 935, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 455.

8 Id.

'Id.

Id. at , 440 P.2d at 937, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
847 Cal. App. 421, 190 P. 850 (1920).
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The result that the court would have reached had the full purchase
price been paid would apparently be grounded on general constructive
trust principles,' and not because the court regarded the money as a
substitute for the land merely because the entire purchase price had been
refunded. The court reasoned that in that situation the Sheridans would
have intended a complete settlement for all liability and that Leeds thus
is presumed to have mistakenly taken money which belongs to the plaintiff. But it is unclear why a constructive trust should be imposed if Leeds
collected the whole amount to which he and the plaintiff were entitled, but
not if he collected less than that amount, but more than that to which
he himself was entitled. Furthermore, damages for fraud would be measured by subtracting the actual value of the property at the time of conveyance from the price paid.8 Given this measure, it may be accurate to
say that the recovery did not "take the place of the land" for remedial
purposes, but still the settlement may have been for more than Leeds'
damages, especially since the damages he prayed for in the prior suit
equalled exactly the purchase price paid to the Sheridans. With this
possibility, why must the plaintiff plead the exact amount Leeds received,
rather than being allowed to take advantage of discovery mechanisms to
ascertain the amount of that recovery?' The court says little to solve
these problems.'
As to the first covenant to restore damaged property, the court found
that even if it could be interpreted to obligate Leeds to correct the fill,
the state's anti-deficiency judgment statute, section 580b of the CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE," would prohibit such an effect. By
I The court cited RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1936), which outlines
the general nature of the constructive trust remedy.
' CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343 (West 1954).
'The plaintiff might have escaped this dilemma by pleading on information and
belief that the defendant had received the entire purchase price, thereafter using
discovery procedures and amending its complaint accordingly. The complaint was
dismissed without leave to amend, however.
0
" Justice Mosk, dissenting, criticized the majority for its inattention to these
problems, and for "hinting" that a future action may lie, while not allowing a
determination in the case before them.
" CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 580b (West Supp. 1967). This section provides'
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property
for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed
of trust, or mortgage, given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance
of the purchase price of real property, or under a deed of trust, or mortgae ,
on a dwelling for not inore than four families given to a lender to secure
repayment of a loan which was in fact used to pay all of or part of the purchase price of such dwelling occupied, entirely or in part by the purchaser.
Italicized portions were adopted by amendment [1963] Cal. Stat., ch. 2158, § 1.
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so ruling, the court applied the statute to a situation markedly different
from that in which such statutes are normally applied.
A "deficiency judgment" has been traditionally defined by the courts
as "that part of a debt which a mortgage was given to secure and [which
2
California's
is] not realized from the sale of mortgaged property."'
to
protection
broad
give
to
interpreted
anti-deficiency statute has been
purchasers of real estate. It was originally enacted in 1933,'3 and was
later modified to prohibit a deficiency judgment "after any sale of real
property for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale ... 2 4
The California courts (before the amendment that specifically so pro5
vided) construed the statute, contrary to other court's interpretations,'
to cover money advanced to the purchaser by persons other than the
vendor.' It has been held that when a grantee of a purchase money
mortgagor assumes the debt he is entitled to the protection of section
580b." The court has also found that a purchase money mortgagor is
protected by the statute from the claims of a holder of a second purchase
security was exhausted in a sale
money deed of trust, even though the
8
by the holder of the first trust deed.'
The court has stated that the purpose of the statute is to insure that
"for a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust, the security alone can
be looked to for recovery of the debt," 9 and thus to put on the lender
the risk that the security may be inadequate at the time of default. An
attempt was subsequently made to ascertain the purposes that the statute was designed to achieve. ° The court discussed and rejected the
possibility that the statute was intended to prevent a creditor from purchasing the mortgaged premises for less than their true value at a forced
sale and thereafter obtaining a large deficiency judgment. Other sections
12 Harrow v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 285 Mich. 349, 353, 280 N.W. 785
787 (1938).
13 [1933] Cal. Stat., ch. 642, § 5.
[1935] Cal. Stat., ch. 680, § 1.
See Currie & Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Lines: A
of Laws Method, 1960 DuKE L.J. 1, 17-18.
in Conflict
StudyBargioni
v. Hill, 59 Cal. 2d 121, 378 P.2d 593, 28 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1963).
1"
"7Stockton Say. & Loan Bank v. Massanet, 18 Cal. 2d 200, 114- P.2d 592
(1941).
18 Brown v. Jenson, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953). Contra, Sivade v.
Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 528, 146 A. 364 (1929). In Gates v. Schuster, 227 Cal. App.
409, 38 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1964), a plaintiff who had sold both real and personal
property and accepted cash and a promissory note secured by a trust deed on the
real property only was held to have contracted to forego further security, and was
therefore unable to obtain a deficiency judgment on the personalty.
10 Brown v. Jenson, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 198, 259 P.2d 425, 427 (1953).
30 Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1963).
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of the California Code 2 ' limit a deficiency judgment under any mortgage
to the difference between the amount of the obligation and the fair market 'value of the property sold. Hence, a mortgagor is protected from
a deficiency judgment following a low auction bid if the fair market value
is equal to or greater than the mortgage debt. The court felt, therefore,
that if section 580b is not merely redundant, it must have been intended
to protect purchase money mortgagors, whether the mortgagee be the
vendor or a third party, from deficiency judgments even when the fair
market value of the land is not as great as the mortgage debt. Also rejected as the basis for the statute was the assertion that the lender knows
more about the property being sold than the buyer.
Three considerations have been accepted as underlying the statute's
stated goal:' (1) to discourage the vendor's overvaluing the land; (2)
to discourage speculative land promotions; and (3) to prevent the aggravation of an economic depression that might result from the purchaser's losing both the land and the amount of the judgment. The Leeds
decision may be evaluated in light of its tendency to further these three
ends. The first goal is not relevant in Leeds because the plaintiff there
was not the vendor. The Leeds decision might tend to further the second goal of braking speculative land sales by forcing potential third
party lenders to investigate the value of the premises offered as security
before extending loans. The third goal, offsetting deflationary tendencies
in the economy, is acknowledged to be the primary objective. The Leeds
case did not involve the most obvious way depressions could be accelerated
by deficiency judgments because, unlike the normal deficiency judgment
action, there was no possibility of the defendant's losing both the land
and part of his other assets.
In ascertaining whether the Leeds decision could operate to lessen
the severity of a depression in some other way, there are two approaches
that might be read into the opinion. It could be contended that the court
held (1) that the plaintiff must bear the risk that the security was damaged at the time of sale only, or (2) that if the security becomes inadequate at any time, for any reason, plaintiff must bear the burden. The
relevant language is:
Even if defendant's agreement to "keep said property in good condition and repair" and to "restore... any building which may be...
damaged or destroyed thereon" could reasonably be interpreted to
21 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§ 580a, 726 (West 1955).
Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873

(1963).
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include an obligation to correct the improper fill condition and repair
all physical damage caused thereby, section 580b of the Code of Civil
Procedure would preclude giving effect to that interpretation ....
To require defendant to correct the condition of the property existing
at the time of sale ...would shift to him one of the risks that section
580b requires plaintiff to bear.2 3
The second interpretation might open the possibility of exhaustion of the
security by a dishonest or negligent mortgagor, with no recourse for the
lender. Both the court's choice of language ("condition . ..existing at
the time of sale") and the background of the decision make it unlikely
that this was the intended meaning.2
If the court's interpretation passed the risk of inadequate security
at the time of sale only to the vendor, the decision has no affect on the
severity of depressions. If offsetting deflationary tendencies is the only
legitimate purpose of section 580b," the statute would apply only when
the fair market value of the premises had fallen below the amount
of the mortgage debt because of declining land values. The plaintiff urged
that fighting such a snowball effect of declining land prices is the sole
aim of the statute, and that the risk placed on the lender was of an economic nature caused by price fluctuation." But the court, by its ruling,
extended the disabling effect of the statute to those lenders who find the
value of the premises to be below the amount of the debt because they
took inadequate security originally, and implicitly held that the statute
had purposes other than "cycle-leveling." The Leeds decision may rest
on the goal of discouraging speculation or on purposes not previously
enumerated by the court.
By apparently refusing to limit section 580b's purpose to "cycleleveling," and by speaking of "the risks that section 580b requires plaintiff to bear"2 7 without explicitly stating what those risks are, the court
has left the mortgagee's rights and contract options open to question. It
is certain that the mortgagee cannot protect himself from the risk that
the security is inadequate at the time the mortgage is made, regardless of
the cause of the inadequacy. Probably, the validity of a promise by a
" - Cal. 2d at -, 440 P.2d at 937, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 457 (citation omitted).
"Easton v. Ash, 18 Cal. 2d 530, 116 P.2d 433 (1941), held that the mortgagor's right to sue for waste remains intact. There is dicta to that effect in Weaver v. Bay, 216 Cal. App. 732, 31 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1963).
" Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A New Judicial
Approach, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1963), suggests that "cycle-leveling" should be
the sole
purpose.
"0 Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, Petition for Hearing by Supreme Court at
8, Cal. 2d ,440 P.2d 933, 68 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1968).
2
Cal. 2d at , 440 P.2d at 937, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
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mortgagor not to impair the security is not affected by the Leeds decision.
In Mills v. Brown,2" a provision in a chattel mortgage on sheep whereby
the mortgagor promised not to sell the sheep, their increase, or their wool
was held to authorize a suit against the mortgagor for conversion, notwithstanding a statutory provision2 9 limiting a mortgagee to one action
to recover the debt or to enforce a right secured by the mortgage. The
court found that the action was not one covered by the statute, but one to
prevent impairment of the security given. This would seem analagous
to an action for impairment of security by a mortgagor-occupier that is
challenged by section 580b. 30 Moreover, the court has not in the past
forbidden the mortgagee's contracting for further security on the same
debt. 1 The validity of a promise by a mortgagor to repair damages due
to the actions of third parties or natural catastrophies, which might be
regarded as "further security," is, nevertheless, put into question by the
Leeds decisionY The court did point out that Leeds involved an unusual situation where the damage had occurred before the transfer of the
land. Also, in suggesting remedies that the mortgagee may still retain,
the court included waste, suits against third parties for tortiously damaging the security, and rights in eminent domain proceedings, but made
no mention of covenants to repair damage not caused by the mortgagor.
There is nothing in the opinion to indicate whether such damage is included in the risks that section 580b puts on the lender, and the validity
of such covenants by the mortgagor should be at least suspect.
Summarizing briefly, it was held by the court that the covenant by
Leeds to assign "[a]ny award of damages" did not entitle plaintiff to a
constructive trust in the proceeds of the settlement, the recovery not being
for injury to land. The court further held that to interpret the covenant
to "keep such property in good condition and repair" as imposing upon
Leeds the duty to correct the fill would pass to him one of the risks section 580b requires the lender to bear. This decision has been evaluated
in light of the three previously accepted reasons for the statute's policy.
In assessing the effects of the decision on the primary goal, preventing
depression, it is unlikely the court intended to require the mortgagee to
28205 Cal. 38, 269 P. 636 (1928).
8 0 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 726 (West 1955).
The dissenter found Mills applicable, Cal. 2d at , 440 P.2d at 938,
68 Cal. Rptr. at 458, and presumably felt that the analogy between realty and personalty
was valid.
"1Mortgage
Guar. Co. v. Sampsell, 51 Cal. App. 2d 180, 124 P.2d 353 (1942).
2 The

court, in a footnote, -

Cal. 2d at -

, 440 P.2d at 936 n.2, 68 Cal.

Rptr. at 456 n.2, did distinguish this case from those in which the damage was
inflicted after the mortgage.

1969]

ACTUAL MALICE TEST

bear the burden of the security's becoming inadequate at any time for
any reason. Since placing the risk of inadequate security at the time of
sale on the mortgagee would not further the anti-depression goal, the
court may have found purposes for section 580b not articulated in prior
decisions. While it is possible to draw some conclusions about the effects of the decision on the mortgagee's position, it is not possible to say
whether a provision making mortgagors responsible for damage to the
security from third parties or natural calamity would be valid.
An authority on the law of mortgages has observed that "[i]n all
legal systems there seems to be in the law of mortgages an evolution from
a forfeit-idea in which the res is given as conditional satisfaction of some
act for which there is no personal duty (at least not one for which there
is a direct action) to a security idea."3 3 This evolution has been due
mainly to the skill of drafters of mortgages and other security agreements
who, typically, are the lenders or their representatives. The California
court's treatment of the anti-deficiency judgment statute has reversed the
trend. The mortgaged real estate is no longer simply a convenient method
for the lender to collect what is owed him, but a device for limiting the
borrower's liability in loan transactions involving the sale of real estate.
The facts that in the typical mortgage the lender is a professional and
the borrowed an amateur, that the lender often is in the better bargaining
position, and that the market is sometimes lacking in competitiveness
may have influenced the reasoning that brought the court to this position.
It is the court's view that these considerations influenced the legislature
in enacting the statute. But the presence or absence of these facts in the
individual case is now irrelevant, the determination having been made in
advance for the whole class of such cases in favor of the borrower.
Thus, California has again given special encouragement to buyers of
land, and in doing so has apparently revived an earlier view of the mortgage relation.
STEPHEN MASON THOMAS

Torts-A Clarification of the Actual Malice Test
In a recent libel case, St. Amant v. Thompson,1 a majority of the
Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified, but declined to expand, the "reckG. OSBORNE, MOJGAGES, § 13, at 31 (1951).
390 U.S. 727 (1968), rev'g 250 La. 405, 196 So. 2d 255 (1967).

